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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
KATHLEEN MARIA NIEBERGER, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
CaseNo.20040907-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). 
The amended Information charges Appellant/Defendant Kathleen Nieberger 
("Appellant" or "Ms. Nieberger") with two counts of child endangerment, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003) (the "child endangerment 
statute"1); possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)(2002); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). Ms. Nieberger 
timely petitioned this Court for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order dated 
October 13, 2004. R. 116-26. See order being appealed from in Addendum A. This 
1
 Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 applies to children and elder adults, for 
the purposes of this brief, Appellant refers to the statute as the child endangerment statute 
and discusses the statute as it applies to children. Because the statute treats children and 
elder adults identically, any decision regarding the application of the statute to children 
would also apply to elder adults. 
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Court granted Ms. Nieberger's request for interlocutory review on the issues set forth 
below. Slee this Court's Order granting interlocutory review in Addendum B. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1. Whether the child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5(2) (2003), is void for vagueness in that the term "exposed to . . . a controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia" and the remainder of the statute 
(a) fails to give notice that having marijuana and paraphernalia in a house where children 
reside constitutes child endangerment under the statute, and (b) fails to provide minimal 
guidelines for enforcement, thereby allowing the crime of child endangerment to be 
prosecuted in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. 
Standard of Review. '" Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of 
law, which [are reviewed] for correctness.'" State v. Green. 2004 UT 76, f42, 99 P.3d 
820 (quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,^[5, 86 P.3d 735) (citations 
omitted)). Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute u'bear[s] the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality.'55 Green, 2004 UT 76, «[|42 (quoting Greenwood v. City of N. Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991)). Moreover, u[t]he constitution tolerates a greater 
degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal statutes." Green, 2004 UT 76, ^43 
(citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
498-99, 102S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). 
2 
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Preservation. This issue was preserved by written motion and argument held at a 
hearing on September 13, 2004. R. 35-49, 140. The judge entered a memorandum 
decision denying Appellant's motion. R. 116-26; see Addendum A. 
Issue 2. Whether the state failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that 
Ms. Nieberger exposed her children to marijuana or drug paraphernalia, thereby 
committing the crime of child endangerment, where marijuana and paraphernalia were 
out of reach and/or in a closet or cupboard in the house where children resided. 
Standard of Review. The determination of whether to bind a defendant over for 
trial is a question of law. See State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1991). 
Accordingly, "[this Court] reviewfs] that determination without deference to the court 
below. See idL at 465-66." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f8, 20 P.3d 300. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below by written motion and argument at 
the hearing held on September 13, 2004. R. 35-49; 140. The magistrate concluded that 
the state established probable cause to bind Ms. Nieberger over for trial on the two 
counts of child endangerment. R. 125. 
TEXT OF STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The text of the following statute and constitutional provision are in Addendum C: 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003). 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged Ms. Nieberger with two counts of child endangerment, a third 
degree felony; possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony; 
and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in an Information filed on 
January 26, 2004. R. 01-03. A preliminary hearing was held on June 10, 2004 before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, acting as a magistrate. R. 51-84. After evidence was 
presented at the preliminary hearing, the state moved to amend the Information to charge 
Count I as unlawful possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. R. 80. After 
Ms. Nieberger argued that the state had failed to establish probable cause to bind her 
over on the two child endangerment counts, Judge Brian bound the case over for trial on 
all counts. R. 81, 84. 
Ms. Nieberger filed a motion to quash the bindover of the child endangerment 
counts and to declare the statute unconstitutional. R. 35-49. The trial court held a 
hearing on the motion on September 13, 2004 and denied the motion on October 13, 
2004. R. 116-26; see Addendum A. 
Ms. Nieberger petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of the denial of her 
motion to quash the child endangerment counts and to declare the statute 
unconstitutional. This Court granted that petition on November 9, 2004. R. 139. 
Ms. Nieberger is not in custody. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 22, 2003, Salt Lake County Detective Jason Watkins executed a 
search warrant at the home of Appellant Kathleen Nieberger and her husband, Edmund 
Nieberger, 5944 West Honesilver Circle in Salt Lake County. R. 53-54. Detective 
Watkins, who was the first person to enter the home, went up the stairs and down a hall 
to the master bedroom at the end of the hall. R. 54-55. Ms. Nieberger, her husband and 
their three-year-old child, C.N., were in that bedroom. R. 55-56. The adult Niebergers 
were handcuffed and taken into custody while their home was searched. R. 56-7. 
Mr. Nieberger would not talk with officers, but Ms. Nieberger cooperated and 
talked with officers after being Mirandized. R. 57. The detective told Ms. Nieberger 
that he had information that her husband was distributing marijuana. R. 57A. 
Ms. Nieberger acknowledged that her husband had been distributing marijuana for five 
years. R. 57A. She also acknowledged that she used marijuana once in awhile when she 
was "having a bad week." R. 57A. Ms. Nieberger told the detective that the only 
contraband in the house that belonged to her were the items on the top shelf of the 
entertainment center in the living room. R. 58, 69. 
On the entertainment center in the living room, the officers found a small plastic 
baggie with marijuana in it and a glass pipe that the officer said was like those commonly 
used to smoke marijuana. R. 58, 60. The items were in front of the VCR on the top level 
of the entertainment center, above the television. R. 60-1. On that same upper level of 
5 
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the entertainment stand, there was a plastic container which the officer thought had 
rolling papers in it, a plastic bowl with a lid on it that the officer thought had some 
marijuana residue inside, another pipe and a tool that the officer thought looked like it 
had been used to scrape resin out of a pipe. R. 61, 72. The entertainment center was five 
to six feet high, and all of the items were on the top level. R. 61, 71. 
The officers also located other contraband in the house. R. 62. They found a bag 
with one hundred and seventy-one grams of marijuana in it in a kitchen cabinet; a digital 
scale was also in that cabinet. R. 62, 64. The cabinet was above the counter, the cabinet 
door was closed, and the bag "was high up in the cabinet." R. 62, 73. The officer 
thought the bag was on the top shelf of the cabinet, but it might have been on the middle 
shelf, and either way, it was probably seven feet above the floor. R. 73. Ms. Nieberger 
is four feet nine inches tall. R. 74. The officer was not sure whether given her height, 
Ms. Nieberger would have been able to see the bag and testified that she would have had 
to stand on something to reach it. R. 76-77. There was no evidence that Ms. Nieberger 
had any knowledge of the existence of the bag of marijuana in the kitchen. R. 62. This 
is reflected by the fact that the state initially charged Count I as Possession with Intent to 
Distribute, but after the preliminary hearing, amended the charge to simple possession of 
marijuana. R. 01-03, 80.
 ( 
In a kitchen cabinet, officers also found a small container with baggies and a pipe; 
the officer was not sure whether these were in the same cabinet as the bag of marijuana 
6 
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or whether the cabinet was above or below the counter. R. 63. Additionally, the officers 
located a metal item in a drawer that had something burned on it and a pill that 
Ms. Nieberger identified as Valium in a plastic bag on the counter. R. 63. The officer 
testified that he thought the three year old might have been able to reach these items, 
"possibly without assistance but for sure if they were standing on something, the older 
one." R. 78. In the basement, the officers found a "bong" or smoking device on top of 
an entertainment center. R. 65. They found another bong in the floor of the closet of the 
master bedroom but could not remember whether the door to the closet was opened or 
closed. R. 65. The bong in the closet was broken and the officer did not remember there 
being any residue or water in the bong. R. 75. None of the items that the officer thought 
were used to inhale marijuana were tested for marijuana or smelled. R. 65, 76. 
There were two children in the house. R. 66. C.N., who was three years old, was 
with her parents in the bedroom when officers arrived. R. 55-6. The other child was two 
years old; the detective did not know whether she was in the children's bedroom or the 
living room when officers arrived. R. 66, 70. The officer estimated that the three year 
old was 2 lA to 3 feet tall and the two year old was shorter. R. 66, 67. The officer 
believed the items on the entertainment center were accessible to the two- and three-year-
old children because they could have dragged a chair to the entertainment stand and 
thereby "enhace[d] how tall they are." R. 68. The officer reiterated that he believed if 
the children had something to stand on, they would have been able to reach the items. 
7 
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R. 68. He did not, however, see any evidence that the children "had been exposed to, 
ingested, inhaled or had contact with controlled substance" "other than the fact the items 
were just laying around the house." R. 78. Nor did he have any information that the 
children had touched the items or that marijuana had been smoked in their presence. 
R. 78. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in refusing to conclude that Utah's child endangerment 
statute is void for vagueness. The statute is void for vagueness because the term 
"exposed to" is not defined and is subject to an expansive interpretation that fails to 
require danger or a significant risk of harm. The broad term "exposed to" coupled with 
the failure to require danger violates due process because the statute (1) fails to give 
notice to an ordinary person of the conduct that can be prosecuted under the child 
endangerment statute, and (2) fails to establish minimal standards for prosecution, 
thereby leaving the decision as to what can be prosecuted under the statute to police, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries. In the context of this case, the child endangerment 
statute failed to give notice to Ms. Nieberger that keeping marijuana and paraphernalia in 
out-of-reach places in her home, where the evidence suggests that every effort was made 
to make the items inaccessible to children, would subject her to prosecution for child 
endangerment. Additionally, the arbitrary manner in which the statute is enforced is 
demonstrated by this case; while many officers would not have filed child endangerment 
i 
8 
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charges in this case where the children had no contact with the marijuana or 
paraphernalia and the items were in high places or otherwise of reach, the officers in this 
case chose otherwise. 
The constitutional infirmities of the child endangerment statute require that it be 
stricken. Alternatively, if this Court believes the statute can be construed to save it from 
its constitutional infirmities, the words "expose to" must be stricken or narrowly 
interpreted to include only those situations where there is a direct connection or contact 
between the child and the contraband. Additionally, the statute must be read to require 
danger or a significant risk of harm to a child. 
Assuming the statute is not stricken, the trial court's denial of the motion to quash 
must nevertheless be reversed. Even if the statute is construed broadly as the trial court 
did to include visual exposure, the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe 
that Ms. Nieberger committed two counts of child endangerment in this case where 
marijuana and paraphernalia were located in high or otherwise out-of-reach places. The 
state failed to present evidence that the children had seen or could see these items or were 
otherwise exposed to them. Moreover, if the statute is interpreted narrowly, there is no 
evidence of impact or direct connection between the contraband and the children nor is 
there any evidence that the children were endangered or faced a significant risk of harm. 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS SINCE IT FAILS TO GIVE NOTICE THAT HAVING 
CONTRABAND IN THE HOME VIOLATES THE STATUTE. AND 
ALLOWS ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
The child endangerment statute is vague on its face and as applied to 
Ms. Nieberger since the statute fails to give notice to an ordinary person that having 
controlled substances and paraphernalia out of reach in a house where children reside is 
prohibited conduct under the statute and also because the statute allows for arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. The language of the statute, including the use of the term 
"exposed to," and the failure of the statute to require danger or a substantial risk of harm 
result in a failure to provide fair warning that Ms. Nieberger's behavior could be 
prosecuted as child endangerment and also allows police officers Judges and juries to 
decide what behavior is prohibited by the statute. Because the child endangerment 
statute is vague as applied under the facts of this case, it violates due process. See 
generally Green. 2004 UT 76, f44 (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates. 455 U.S. at 495, n.7). 
A. A STATUTE IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS WHEN IT FAILS TO 
GIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDUCT THAT IS PROHIBITED OR FAILS 
TO ESTABLISH MINIMAL GUIDELINES THEREBY ALLOWING 
ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
Principals of procedural due process prohibit the application of a statute that is 
vague. Green, 2004 UT 76, f43. A penal statute is unconstitutionally vague when it 
fails to '"define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
10 
-
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understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.'" Id (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 
103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 
A statute is vague, in violation of due process, if it violates either the notice or 
arbitrary enforcement aspect of the doctrine. Green, 2004 UT 76, *|43. 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that 
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may 
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. 
Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted). Courts have less tolerance for vague provisions that carry criminal penalties 
than they do for vagueness in civil statutes. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-
99; Green, 2004 UT 76443. 
The notice aspect of the vagueness doctrine requires that a statute be invalidated 
when the statute "fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to 
understand what conduct it prohibits[.]" City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 
119 S.Ct. 1849, 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d 67, 80 (1999). The purpose of this aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine "is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the 
law." Id. at 58. A loitering statute that made it a crime to "remain in any one place with 
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no apparent purpose "fail[ed] to give an ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is 
forbidden and what is permitted," and therefore violated this first aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine. Id. at 51, n. 14, 60. A child endangerment statute that applied to a person who 
"[p]laces [a] dependent in a situation that may endanger his life or health," thereby 
allowing prosecution in circumstances where there was only a possibility of harm, also 
violated this first aspect of the vagueness doctrine because it failed to give notice to 
persons of ordinary intelligence of the conduct proscribed by the statute. State v. 
Downey. 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 1985). 
Both aspects of the vagueness test are important and bear on whether the 
prohibitions of the statute are sufficiently defined so as to comply with due process. See 
Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 819 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). While the notice 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is important, the vagueness requirement that the 
legislature establish minimal guidelines so as to protect against arbitrary enforcement is 
of even greater importance. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58. 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and 
arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other 
principal element of the doctrine - - the requirement that a legislature 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may 
permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections." 
Id. (citations omitted). This second aspect of the vagueness doctrine provides an 
"'independent reason5 for deeming a criminal law void for vagueness when the 
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challenged law authorizes arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement." United States v. 
Regan. 93 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing Morales. 119 S.Ct. at 1859). 
The second prong of the vagueness doctrine forbids the delegation of "basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications." Grayned, 
408 U.S. at 108-09. In determining whether '"the broad sweep of the ordinance . . . 
violates5 the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement" (Regan, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citations omitted)), courts consider whether 
the statute places objective limitations on those charged with enforcing the statute. Id. 
(citing inter alia Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358). Because allowing officers, judges or juries 
to decide whether a law has been violated offends "notions of fairness and concerns 
about arbitrary government conduct," due process is violated when a statute fails to 
establish minimal guidelines for enforcement and instead leaves that decision to others. 
Regan, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
In this context, a court must consider whether the challenged law 
"necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgement of 
the police man on his beat. [ ] The arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement 
prong derives from both notions of fairness and concerns about arbitrary 
government conduct - - both of which are as old as the Republic. The 
constitutional principle undergirding the Due Process Clause is that citizens 
should never be subjected to the whims of an unrestrained executive. 
Through the arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement prong of the 
vagueness challenge, an individual argues that because the particular law 
only vaguely defines the prohibited conduct, the relevant legislative or 
regulatory body has surrendered its lawmaking power to an executive 
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official, thereby vesting complete discretion in that official. Thus, the age 
old threat of arbitrary government action is realized. 
Ii 
The procedural due process limitations against allowing police officers, juries or 
prosecutors to decide the reach of a statute are well recognized. See e ^ Morales, 527 
U.S. at 60-63; Regan, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 88; Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.E.2d 582, 
584 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). A loitering statute that does not contain guidelines for 
enforcement and instead "'provides absolute discretion to police officers to determine 
what activities constitute loitering'" violates this second aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine. Morales, 527 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). Likewise, a child endangerment 
statute that allows prosecution when there "may" be a possibility of risk of physical or 
moral harm to a child violates this second aspect of the vagueness doctrine since it allows 
law enforcement to decide what conduct may create the possibility of a risk of harm. 
Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585. 
The child endangerment statute at issue in Carter was vague because it failed to 
establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby leaving it to law enforcement 
to decide what conduct constituted child endangerment. Id The language of the statute, 
which prohibited placing a child in a situation that "may" cause moral or physical harm, 
left law enforcement to decide, "guided by subjectivity and personal predilection" the 
conduct which falls within the statute. Id. 
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By using the term "may," the legislature criminalizes any act which 
presents a "possibility" of physical or moral harm to a child. [ ]. Thus, 
guided by subjectivity and personal predilection, police and prosecutors in 
this instance concluded that the factually diverse conduct of each defendant 
possibly endangered the life, health, or morals of minors then in their 
custody. This determination may have resulted from individual moral 
imperatives, unique perspectives on specific conduct, or defendants' mere 
status. [ ] Whatever the motivation and however well-intentioned, the 
vague and inclusive language clearly failed to adequately inform law 
enforcement of the precise conduct prohibited by Code § 40A-103, thereby 
accommodating arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Id. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123 ("It cannot be 
left to juries, judges, and prosecutors" to decide how to apply a statute.). 
Accordingly, when a statute fails to give notice as to what conduct is proscribed or 
fails to establish minimal guideline for enforcement, it is unconstitutional in violation of 
due process. Under such circumstances, due process requires that the statute be stricken. 
See Morales, 527 U.S. at 56 (pointing out that "[v]agueness may invalidate a law" either 
because the statute fails to give notice or because it does not establish minimal guidelines 
for enforcement). 
B. UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE ALLOWS 
EXPANSIVE PROSECUTION WITHOUT DEFINING "EXPOSED TO" 
AND WITHOUT CLARIFYING WHETHER DANGER OR A 
SIGNIFICANT RISK OF APPRECIABLE HARM IS REQUIRED. 
Utah's child endangerment statute violates both aspects of the vagueness doctrine 
in that it fails to provide sufficient detail to give notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute and also fails to provide 
minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby allowing for arbitrary and 
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discriminatory enforcement. The child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-112.5(2003), states: 
76-5-112.5. Endangerment of a child or elder adult. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be 
used as a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or 
any other chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance. Intent under this subsection may be 
demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner of storage, or 
proximity to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in 
Subsection 76-5-109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is 
defined in Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is 
defined in Section 58-37a-3. 
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person 
who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in 
Subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person 
who violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers 
bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure 
to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia is guilty of a second degree 
felony unless the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the 
death of the child or elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a 
felony of the first degree. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section 
that the controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for 
the child or elder adult, and that it was administered to the child or 
elder adult in accordance with the prescription instructions provided 
with the controlled substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same 
definition as in Section 58-37-2. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003). 
In interpreting a statute, courts first consider the plain language of a statute. 
Travelers/Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wilson. 2002 UT App 221, lfl2, 51 P.3d 1288. When 
considering the plain language of a statute, courts "presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29, ^ [12, 24 P.3d 928 
(citations omitted). Courts "'read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and 
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter or related 
chapters.'" State v. Ireland. 2005 UT App 22, f8, 517 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (quoting Miller 
v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592). Words in a statute that have a commonly 
accepted meaning should be given that common, lay meaning unless there is an indication 
that the legislature intended otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co.. 2002 UT App 221, ^ [12. 
When the language of the statute is not clear, courts look beyond the language of 
the statute and utilize other methods of statutory construction. The focus in analyzing the 
statute remains, however, on effectuating the legislative intent. Where possible, a statute 
must be construed so as to avoid "constitutional infirmities." Intermountain Slurry Seal v. 
Labor Comm'n.. 2002 UT App 164, ^ 6, 48 P.3d 252 (citing In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 
2000 UT 28,1J23, 1 P.3d 1074 (citations and quotations omitted)). 
In construing a statute, our aim is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. When doubt or 
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an 
analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions 
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harmonized in accordance with legislative intent and purpose. One of the 
cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to the 
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context 
and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject. Further, we have 
a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate the 
legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflict or 
infirmities. 
Id. Moreover, while the title of a statute is ordinarily not considered part of its text, when 
the language of the statute is ambiguous, courts will consider the title in construing a 
statute. Estate of Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 521-22 (Utah 1997). 
The language of Utah's child endangerment statute allows prosecution for allowing 
exposure to controlled or chemical substances or paraphernalia without clarifying the 
meaning of "exposed to" and without clarifying whether danger or a significant risk of 
harm is required. The meaning of the term "exposed to" is ambiguous in that it is not 
clear whether the child must have direct contact with or a connection to the contraband or 
whether just seeing the item is enough, and it is also not clear whether any actual danger 
or significant risk of harm is required in order to be "exposed to" contraband within the 
meaning of the statute. Because the language is ambiguous, legislative history and the 
title of the statute can be considered in determining the reach of the statute. See id. 
Legislative history demonstrates that the legislature did not intend for the statute to 
be broadly applied to circumstances such as these where parents have marijuana and 
paraphernalia out of reach in their home where their children also reside. Instead, the 
legislative history of the child endangerment statute demonstrates that the legislature 
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intended to reach behavior that caused direct contact or direct connection between 
children or the elderly and controlled substances, chemical substances or paraphernalia, 
and which raised "significant risks of injury or even potential death to child, or to the 
elderly." Senate Bill 188, House Debates (February 29, 2000); see legislative history at 
R. 88-02 in Addendum D. 
In passing the legislation in 2000, both houses focused on the danger to children 
and the elderly that arise when a person is operating a clandestine lab and producing 
methamphetamine in a home where children or the elderly reside. Senate Bill 188, Senate 
Debates (February 22, 2000); House Debates (February 29, 2000); see Addendum D. In 
fact, the discussion in the House focused on methamphetamine labs, and in summation, 
Representative Cox reiterated that u[l]aw enforcement has been working very hard to 
clean up the meth labs in our communities" and the child endangerment statute provided 
them a better tool to do that. R. 94. The Senate likewise focused on the dangers to 
children and the elderly caused by the production of methamphetamine in their homes. 
R. 96. Legislative history therefore demonstrates that in passing the child endangerment 
statute in 2000, the legislature intended the statute to be applied when danger or a 
significant risk of harm is created by intentionally or knowingly permitting a child to have 
contact with or be impacted by a controlled or chemical substance or paraphernalia. 
The legislative history also shows that the 2002 amendments to the statute were not 
intended to change the reach of the statute so as to allow prosecution when there was not 
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danger or a substantial risk of harm, and instead were aimed at correcting two 
"oversights" in the 2000 statute. Although the 2002 amendments removed the 
requirement that the defendant "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or permit[] a child or 
elder adult to be at risk of suffering bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious 
bodily injury," that change was not intended to broaden the reach of the statute and 
instead was aimed at precluding the need for scientific evidence to establish the danger of 
controlled substances. House Bill 125, House Debates (February 25, 2002); Senate 
Debates (March 5, 2002); R. 95, 99 in Addendum D. In addition, the legislature added an 
exception for prescription medication in 2002. Hence, the legislative intent in adopting 
and amending the child endangerment statute was to criminalize conduct that created 
danger or a significant risk of harm. 
The title of the statute also demonstrates that the legislature intended that it 
proscribe conduct that endangers children or that causes a substantial risk of 
endangerment. While ingestion or inhalation of a controlled substance by a child 
demonstrates a substantial risk of harm without more, being "exposed to" a controlled or 
chemical substance or paraphernalia, when broadly defined, does not. In fact, in this case 
where the marijuana and paraphernalia were placed on the top shelf of an entertainment 
center or in a cupboard seven feet high, a substantial risk of appreciable harm to the 
children did not exist. 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although the legislature focused primarily on clandestine methamphetamine 
production and the serious risks to children when methamphetamine is produced in their 
home, the statute contains far broader language that renders it unconstitutional. 
By not requiring any danger or a substantial risk of harm and by not defining the term 
"exposed to," the child endangerment statute violates due process. While statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional, when a statute as applied to a defendant such as 
Ms. Nieberger fails to give notice or allows for arbitrary enforcement, that statute must be 
invalidated as a violation of due process. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 56. 
C. UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENSSS BECAUSE IT FAILS TO GIVE NOTICE AS TO 
CONDUCT PROHIBITED UNDER THE STATUTE. 
Utah's child endangerment statute fails to give notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence regarding the nature of the conduct that is prohibited. As applied to the facts 
of this case, the statute fails to give notice that having marijuana and paraphernalia out of 
reach in a house where children live would give rise to prosecution for child 
endangerment. The failure of the statute to specify the limitations of the term "exposed 
to" along with the ambiguity of that term in the context of the statute and the failure to 
require danger or a significant risk of harm demonstrates the lack of notice inherent in the 
statute. Because the statute fails to give the required notice, it is void for vagueness in 
violation of due process. 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The term "exposed to" is not defined in the statute and provides unclear direction 
as to the behavior that might "expose" a child to a controlled substance, chemical 
substance or paraphernalia. While the statute makes it unlawful to intentionally allow a 
child to be exposed to a controlled substance or paraphernalia, it does not specify 
whether being "exposed to" requires some direct contact or connection, whether being in 
the vicinity of the contraband without any connection is sufficient, or whether simply 
seeing the contraband amounts to a violation of the statute. Nor does the term "exposed 
to" specify whether the exposure must create danger or a significant risk of harm to the 
child. 
The trial court relied on the following definition of the word "expose" found in 
Random House Webster's Dictionary in reaching its conclusion the word "expose" as 
used in the statute includes visual exposure of contraband to children. R. 122. 
1 .a. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film) to the 
action of light. 3. To make visible . . . 4.a. To make known (e.g., a crime); 
b. To reveal the guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without 
shelter or food. 
R. 122, citing Random House Webster's Dictionary 250 (4th ed. 2001). Other dictionaries 
likewise contain multiple definitions for the word "expose." For example, Webster's 
New World Dictionary defines the word "expose" as follows: 
la) to lay open (to danger, attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected b) to 
make accessible or subject (to an influence or action) 2 to put or leave out in 
an unprotected place, abandon [some ancient peoples exposed unwanted 
infants] 3 to allow to be seen; disclose; reveal; exhibit; display 4 a) to make 
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(a crime, fraud, etc.) known; unmask b) to make known the crimes, etc. of 5 
Photog. To subject (a sensitized film or plate) to radiation having a 
photochemical effect. 
Webster's New World Dictionary 501 (4th ed. 2003). These multiple definitions 
demonstrate that the word "expose" has many different meanings and applications and 
that the word does not have a commonly understood and accepted meaning because of the 
nuances in the use of the word. The trial court's conclusion that this term applied in its 
commonly understood meaning in the context of this statute was incorrect in light of these 
multiple definitions and the nuances in the use of the term. 
In addition, the use of the word in the context of the statute raises additional 
ambiguities. The statute requires that an adult allow a child uto be exposed to" a 
substance or paraphernalia; in other words, the language of the statute requires exposure 
of the child to the substance or paraphernalia and not that the substance or paraphernalia 
be exposed to the child. That wording suggests that the first definition of "expose" found 
in Webster's Dictionary, "to lay open (to danger, attack ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected 
or to make accessible or subject (to an influence or action)" is the definition applicable to 
the child endangerment statute. Pursuant to that definition, a child who is laid open to or 
subjected to danger from a controlled substance or paraphernalia, has been "exposed to" 
an item within the meaning of the statute. 
The use of the word "exposure" in subsection (3) is consistent with this definition 
and further demonstrates that the statute outlaws exposure of the child to the contraband 
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and not the other way around. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty for violation of the 
statute when "a child . . . actually suffers bodily injury . . . by exposure to .. . a controlled 
substance . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). 
Rather than considering the context in which the term "exposed to" is used in the 
statute, the trial court defined the word "expose" as to "to lay open", "make visible" or "to 
remove from shelter," and concluded that since the contraband was in plain view, it was 
laid open or made visible to children. R. 122, 124. In other words, the trial court 
concluded that the contraband was visible to the children and therefore exposed to them. 
Since the statute requires that the children "be exposed to" the contraband, and not the 
other way around, this was an incorrect reading of the statute. 
The trial court's determination that the words "exposed to" in the child 
endangerment statute encompasses any items that are visible or in plain view to children 
emphasizes the ambiguity of that word as used in this statute. R. 122, 124. According to 
the trial court, any time a child sees an item of contraband, regardless of whether there is 
any possibility of danger to the child, the adult can be prosecuted for allowing that 
sighting. Allowing a child to watch a television program where an actor is using drugs, 
look through a shop window where a pipe is displayed, or go to a concert in a park where 
people are smoking marijuana would all amount to child endangerment under the trial 
court's definition of exposure. 
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In addition to the trial court's expansive reading of the statute to include visual 
sighting of contraband, the broad dictionary definitions demonstrate that almost any 
action of permitting a child to be near a controlled or chemical substance or paraphernalia 
could arguably amount to exposure under the statute. For example, has a parent permitted 
a child to be exposed to paraphernalia if he takes the child into a store where cigarette 
rolling papers are sold? Under the broad dictionary definition of the word "expose," a 
child would be subjected to paraphernalia under these circumstances. Or, what if a parent 
talks about a controlled substance or paraphernalia in front of a child? Discussing 
controlled substances in front of someone arguably subjects or exposes that person to a 
controlled substance. Moreover, since the statute outlaws exposure to chemical 
substances, under the trial court's interpretation and the broad definitions for "expose," 
strong cleaning products or paint thinner in a house could result in prosecution under this 
statute simply because the child was near to or saw the products.2 
The statute fails to give fair notice of the conduct that it proscribes not only 
because the words "expose to" encompass a broad spectrum of actions, but also because 
the statute does not contain any language that limits the application of the statute to 
2
 The child endangerment statute defines "chemical substance" as "a precursor in 
the manufacture of controlled substance"; intent is demonstrated by the "substance's use, 
quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors or to manufacturing 
equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(a) (2002). Under this definition, Drano 
stored in the same cupboard as a glass container or iodine, otherwise innocent behavior, 
could be prosecuted as child endangerment under the statute. 
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circumstances where the "exposure" creates actual danger or at least a significant risk of 
harm. In fact, the language of the statute is so broad that it does not require any 
connection between the child and the contraband and does not require any significant 
i 
potential for harm. Accordingly, Utah's child endangerment statute did not provide fair 
notice to Ms. Nieberger that possessing marijuana and paraphernalia, which were kept in 
places out of reach to children, would subject her to prosecution for child endangerment. 
Like the loitering statute in Morales, Utah's child endangerment statute fails to 
give fair notice as to what acts it prohibits. In Morales, the Court concluded that the 
Illinois loitering statute did not give fair notice as to what loitering conduct was 
prohibited. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 57-60. Similarly, Utah's child endangerment statute 
fails the notice inquiry since it does not give notice to parents or others who are in the 
vicinity of children as to what acts in connection with controlled or chemical substances 
or paraphernalia will give rise to prosecution as child endangerment. In the context of 
this case, Utah's child endangerment statute failed to give notice that possessing 
marijuana and paraphernalia, even though those items were kept out of reach, would give 
rise to prosecution for child endangerment. Like the unconstitutional loitering statute in 
Morales, Utah's child endangerment statute violates the first aspect of the vagueness test 
because it does not provide a standard of conduct to which persons can conform their 
behavior in order to not be prosecuted for child endangerment. See id. 
The Constitution does not permit a legislature to "set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say 
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who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221,23 L.Ed. 563 (1876). This ordinance is 
therefore vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his 
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather 
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402U.S. 611, 614,29L.Ed.2d214, 91 S.Ct. 1686(1971). 
Morales, 527 U.S. at 60. 
The decision in Downey, holding that the Indiana child endangerment statute failed 
to provide adequate notice as to what conduct it prohibited, further demonstrates that 
Utah's child endangerment statute fails the first prong of the vagueness inquiry. See 
Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123. The statute in Downey made it unlawful to place a 
dependent "in a situation that may endanger his life or health." Id. The court read the 
statute as "proscribing] placements which to some degree are likely to bring a dependent 
into a situation in which he is exposed to harm." IcL Because the statute did not require 
that the conduct give rise to "a danger which is actual and appreciable," the court 
concluded that it left persons to guess as to what conduct "may" endanger a child, thereby 
violating due process. Id. Like the child endangerment statute at issue in Downey, the 
language of Utah's child endangerment statute is so broad that it does not require a 
substantial likelihood of harm to the child or contact between the child and the chemical 
or controlled substance or paraphernalia and does not therefore "indicate where the line is 
to be drawn between trivial and substantial things so that erratic arrests and convictions 
for trivial acts and omissions will not occur." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123. 
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Child endangerment statutes in other jurisdictions that have at least tied the 
defendant's actions to the creation of a possibility of risk of harm have nevertheless been 
considered unconstitutionally vague because "persons of common intelligence are left to 
guess about the statute's meaning." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123. By not clarifying 
whether danger or even the possibility of harm to the child is required, Utah's statute fails 
to specify what type of impact or potential impact, if any. the controlled substances, 
chemical substances or paraphernalia must have on the child, and therefore offers even 
less clarity than the statute in Downey. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the inclusion 
of the broad term "exposed to." Accordingly, the statute failed to give notice to 
Ms. Nieberger that possessing marijuana and a pipe and keeping them at the top of a five 
to six-foot-high entertainment center or having other items of contraband in her home 
would give rise to a child endangerment charge when there is no showing that the 
children had any connection to the items or faced a substantial risk of appreciable danger. 
D. UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS ALSO VOID 
FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ESTABLISH MINIMAL 
GUIDELINES AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO ARBITRARY AND 
DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION. 
Additionally, even if Utah's child endangerment statute informed a person of 
ordinary intelligence that having controlled substances in the home under the 
circumstances of this case could be prosecuted as child endangerment, the statute 
nevertheless is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to establish minimal guidelines 
and is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 61. 
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Just as the loitering statute in Morales "'provides absolute discretion to police officers to 
determine what activities constitute loitering/" Utah's child endangerment statute leaves 
absolute discretion to police officers to determine what constitutes permitting a child "to 
be exposed to" controlled or chemical substances or paraphernalia. See id 
The broad definition of the term "exposed to" and the failure of the statute to 
require that the child be exposed to danger or a serious risk of appreciable harm leave the 
enforcement of the statute to the "subjectivity and personal predilection" of officers, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries. See Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585. As previously outlined, 
the term "exposed to" has multiple meanings which render the statute ambiguous, thereby 
allowing officers rather than the legislature to decide what actions amount to child 
endangerment under the statute. Moreover, since the statute does not require that a child 
be subjected to danger, officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries are left to decide whether 
a particular action amounts to exposure under the statute. 
The decision in Carter, concluding that the child endangerment statute at issue in 
that case allowed arbitrary government action in violation of the second aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine, highlights the problems with Utah's statute. See Id. at 583. The 
child endangerment statute in Carter violated the second aspect of the vagueness doctrine 
because it allowed prosecution based on the possibility that the defendant's conduct may 
threaten the health or morals of a child. Id This imprecise standard left the decision as to 
what conduct fit within the statute to the "subjectivity and personal predilection" of police 
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and prosecutors who, based on "individual moral imperatives, unique perspectives on 
specific conduct, or defendants' mere status" (id at 585) could decide the defendant's 
conduct fit within the child endangerment statute. The problem with this is that 
"[w]hatever the motivation and however well-intentioned," such an approach 
'"necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment to moment judgment of the policeman on 
his beat,'" resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 
(quoting Koiender, 461 U.S. at 359); see also Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585; Downey, 476 
N.E.2datl23. 
Similarly, Utah's child endangerment statute leaves the determination as to what 
conduct constitutes permitting a child "to be exposed to" controlled substances, chemical 
substances or paraphernalia to the discretion of officers and prosecutors. While many 
officers might have concluded that marijuana and a pipe secreted on the top shelf of an 
entertainment center that stood five to six feet high and other items kept out of reach of 
children do not demonstrate that a two and three year old were "exposed to" marijuana 
and paraphernalia, the officer in this case decided otherwise.3 The arbitrariness of 
3
 Marijuana and items the officer considered paraphernalia were also found in an 
upper shelf of the kitchen, a kitchen drawer, the upper shelf of a downstairs 
entertainment center, and a closet. Ms. Nieberger told officers that the items on the 
entertainment center were the only contraband in the house that belonged to her. The 
state failed to put on evidence that the one hundred seventy-one grams of marijuana 
found in a bag in the kitchen or other items of contraband belonged to Ms. Nieberger. 
This is evidenced by the state's motion at the close of the preliminary hearing to amend 
Count I from possession with intent to distribute to simple possession and the existence 
of only one count of paraphernalia, presumably based on the pipe on the shelf. Even if 
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charging child endangerment in this case is emphasized by the fact that the officer did not 
see either of the children in contact with or even near the items. Additionally, the children 
were two and three years old and stood less than three feet tall. The officer acknowledged 
that the children would have had to drag a chair to the entertainment center in order to 
reach the items. While the officer in this case decided that the remote possibility that a 
two year old would drag a chair over to the entertainment center, climb on the chair, reach 
the items, and possibly harm herself by ingesting or licking the items gave rise to one 
charge of child endangerment, many officers would decide otherwise. 
In addition, Utah's child endangerment statute leaves to police and prosecutors the 
determination of whether danger or potential harm is required and, if so, what constitutes 
such danger or potential harm. While many police officers would require a closer nexus 
between the conduct of possessing the contraband and the impact on the children, whether 
that be actual danger or a substantial likelihood of appreciable harm, than that which 
occurred in this case, the statute fails to specify minimal requirements in this area. This 
failure of the statute to specify the nature of the danger or connection required between 
the contraband and the child further demonstrates the broad sweep of the statute and its 
susceptibility to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Utah's statute allows an even 
the state did attribute these other items to Ms. Nieberger, however, the analysis does not 
change. The one hundred seventy-one grams of marijuana were in a bag on a shelf out of 
reach of the children. One of the bongs was broken and there was no evidence that the 
children had access to or contact with any of the items; the items were simply located in 
the house where the children resided. 
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broader application than the unconstitutional child endangerment statute at issue in Carter 
since the Carter statute required that the proscribed conduct at least create possible harm 
to the child. See Carter. 462 S.E.2d at 585. 
The trial court's decision in this case likewise emphasizes the standardless sweep 
of Utah's child endangerment statute and the concomitant arbitrariness of its application. 
The trial court recognized that the statute "reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow 
the fact finder to determine under the specific facts of the case whether a child or elder 
were 'exposed' to 'a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia." 
R. 122, 123. Contrary to the trial court's resolution, the broad, undefined sweep of the 
term "expose to" renders the statute unconstitutional precisely because it allows 
policemen, prosecutors, judges, and juries to decide what conduct constitutes exposure. 
Moreover, because Utah's child endangerment statute fails to establish minimal guidelines 
and entrusts lawmaking to officers and prosecutors, it fails the second prong of the 
vagueness doctrine and must be overturned as a violation of due process. 
E. THE VAGUENESS OF UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT 
STATUTE REQUIRES THAT IT BE INVALIDATED. 
When a statute is unconstitutionally vague and is "'not reasonably susceptible to a 
limiting construction," the statute must be invalidated. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 51 
(citation omitted); see also In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, f25, 61 P.3d 1038 (invalidating 
statute based on its overbreadth where statute could not reasonably be construed to meet 
due process requirements). While courts construe a statute in order "to 'effectuate the 
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legislative intent5 while avoiding interpretations that conflict with relevant constitutional 
mandates," (In re Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted)), in doing so, a court cannot rewrite the statute. In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 
110, f25. In attempting to construe a statute so as to meet constitutional requirements, 
courts are nevertheless limited "by reasonable canons of statutory construction." IdL A 
court cannot"'infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the 
interpretation must be based on the language used, a [court has] no power to rewrite the 
statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'" Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, 
u[i]n considering the ordinary meaning of the terms of a statute, [courts] will not interpret 
the language so that it results in an application that is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, 
[or] in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.5" Id. (citations omitted). 
The vagueness of the child endangerment statute requires that it be invalidated 
since in order to construe the statute to meet constitutional requirements, this Court would 
have to rewrite the statute and such an interpretation would render the statute confusing 
and inoperable. First, since the statute does not include a requirement that a child be 
endangered, grafting that requirement onto the statute would require adding substantive 
terms and otherwise rewriting the statute. Second, including the "exposed to55 language 
renders the statute "confusing, inoperable and in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute55 due to the numerous definitions of exposure and the failure of the 
statute to require a significant risk of actual danger from exposure. Because the statute 
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cannot be construed so as to give notice as to what is prohibited and to preclude arbitrary 
enforcement while also effectuating the legislative intent, it must be stricken.4 
F. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THIS COURT ATTEMPTS TO SAVE THE 
STATUTE FROM ITS CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES, THE 
INTERPRETATION MUST NARROW THE APPLICATION TO 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE DIRECT CONTACT OR CONNECTION 
BETWEEN THE CHILD AND THE CONTRABAND CREATES 
ACTUAL DANGER OR A SIGNIFICANT RISK OF HARM. 
Although Appellant believes that the statute cannot be construed so as to save it 
from its constitutional infirmities, if this Court believes otherwise, to meet due process 
concerns the words "exposed to" must be stricken or defined narrowly, and the statute as a 
whole must be read to require danger or a significant risk of harm to a child. Construed in 
this manner, the statute would retain some "residual vagueness" but would be closer to the 
type of statute mandated by due process. See Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123 (recognizing 
that "residual vagueness" remained despite narrow construction of the child 
endangerment statute, but concluding that due process requirements were met under 
narrowed construction in light of concern for health and welfare of children). 
First, the words "exposed to" must either be stricken because of the wide range of 
definitions available for that term, or narrowly limited to circumstances where there is 
4
 A facial challenge based on the statute's vagueness exists "if the statute is shown 
to be vague in all of its applications, beginning with its application to the facts at hand." 
Green. 2004 UT 76, [^45 n.15, citing State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 12, 84 P.3d 1171. 
In this case where Utah's child endangerment statute is vague as applied, it is also vague 
on its face since it is unclear whether it requires actual danger and the words "exposed 
to" have limitless application. 
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contact between the child and the controlled substance or the controlled substance has 
some physical impact on the child, and the contact or impact creates actual danger or a 
significant risk of danger to the child. See id. The term "exposed to" is found in a list of 
actions that include "to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-112.5(2). It must therefore be read narrowly and in harmony with these surrounding 
terms. See Ireland, 2005 Ut App 22 at % 11 (reading word "consumption" narrowly and in 
harmony with surrounding terms). The terms surrounding "exposed to" require a more 
significant impact than merely being in the vicinity of an item or seeing it. Instead, there 
must be an actual touching or entry into the body. In fact, the trial court recognized that 
pursuant to its interpretation of "exposed to," that term did not require the same level of 
conduct as the other terms in the statute. R. 124. The trial court's interpretation was 
therefore incorrect since the term "exposed to" must be interpreted in harmony with the 
surrounding terms. See id. 
In addition, the title of the statute supports an interpretation requiring danger. 
Because the language of the statute is ambiguous, consideration of the title is appropriate. 
See Estate of Stephens, 935 P.2d at 521-22. The title of the statute, "Endangerment of a 
child or elder adult" demonstrates that the statute is aimed at circumstances where a child 
is actually endangered by the conduct. 
Moreover, the legislative intent supports a narrow interpretation of the words 
"exposed to" and application of the statute only where the conduct creates actual danger 
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or a significant risk of actual and appreciable harm. The legislature passed this statute in 
2000 to address the "significant risks of injury or even potential death to children, or to 
the elderly" that arise when a person is operating a clandestine drug lab around children or 
the elderly. R. 86, 96; see Addendum D. The legislature's focus on the danger caused by 
methamphetamine labs and its concern about the danger caused by these labs 
demonstrates that the legislature did not intend the expansive application of the statute to 
circumstances like these where marijuana is found in a home where children reside and 
instead was aimed at the far more dangerous circumstances where methamphetamine is 
being produced around children or the elderly, or where children are otherwise 
endangered. 
The 2002 amendments did not change the legislative intent. Although the 
legislature deleted the portion of the statute that required that the child "be at risk of 
suffering bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury from exposure" 
(see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2000) in Addendum E), it did so not to change the 
reach of the statute, but to preclude the need for scientific evidence regarding the dangers 
of controlled substances. R. 95, 99. In fact, in proposing the amendment, Representative 
Beck pointed out that the child endangerment statute is "obviously intended to cover the 
situation where a person knowingly and intentionally gives a child or elder adult a 
controlled substance and thereby exposes him or her to injury." R. 95. 
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The title of the statute and the legislative history support a narrow reading of the 
statute to apply only in those circumstances where children are subjected to danger or a 
significant risk of actual and appreciable harm. The constitutional infirmities of the 
statute and rules of statutory construction therefore require that, at the very least, the term 
"exposed to" be stricken or narrowly construed to require some sort of impact or 
connection between the child and the contraband, and also to require actual danger or a 
significant risk of danger to the child. 
The court in Downey construed Indiana's child endangerment statute narrowly in 
order to save it from its constitutional infirmities. Although the statute violated due 
process when construed literally because it subjected persons to prosecution based on the 
mere possibility that an action may endanger a child, the court concluded that a non-literal 
and narrow construction of the possibility of harm language could save the statute. 
Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122-23. The court recognized that it could not "amend a statute 
or establish public policy within its judicial authority to confine legislative products to 
constitutional limits." Id at 123. It could, however, "in reading a statute for 
constitutional testing, [ ] give it a narrowing construction to save it from nullification, 
where such construction does not establish a new or different policy basis and is 
consistent with legislative intent." Id. (citation omitted). 
With those guidelines in mind, the Downey court construed Indiana's child 
endangerment statute "as applying to situations that endanger the life or health of a 
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dependent." IcL The court clarified that "[t]he placement must itself expose the 
dependent to danger which is actual and appreciable." IcL While acknowledging that this 
narrower construction of the statute had "residual vagueness," the court was willing to 
accept that residual vagueness in light societal concerns regarding the health and safety of 
children. IcL; see also Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585 (severing portion of child endangerment 
statute that was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed prosecution for the mere 
possibility of danger, and leaving remainder of statute in place). 
Should this Court conclude that Utah's child endangerment statute can be 
construed to save it from constitutional infirmities, this Court should at the very least 
strike the term "exposed to" or narrowly construe that term and require that a person must 
permit a direct connection or contact between the child and contraband which creates 
actual danger or a significant risk of harm in order to be prosecuted for child 
endangerment. 
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO SUPPORT A BINDOVER ON TWO COUNTS OF CHILD 
ENDANGERMENT WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT 
PARAPHERNALIA AND MARIJUANA WERE IN THE HOUSE 
WHERE THE CHILDREN RESIDED BUT DID NOT ESTABLISH 
THAT THE CHILDREN WERE "EXPOSED TO" THOSE ITEMS. 
The child endangerment charges should be dismissed not only because the statute 
is void for vagueness in violation of due process, but also because the state failed to 
establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Nieberger had committed two counts of child 
endangerment. Regardless of whether the statute is given a broad interpretation or this 
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Court attempts to narrow the statute in an effort to save it from its constitutional 
infirmities, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe Ms. Nieberger committed 
the crime of child endangerment. Although the standard for bindover is low, the trial 
court erred in refusing to quash the bindover in this case where credible evidence failed to 
demonstrate probable cause to believe Ms. Nieberger committed two counts of child 
endangerment. 
A. EVEN IF THE STATUTE IS GIVEN UNLIMITED APPLICATION, 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MS. NIEBERGER 
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY EXPOSED HER CHILDREN TO 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AND PARAPHERNALIA. 
Even if the term "exposed to" is given a broad definition, the state did not establish 
probable cause to believe that Ms. Nieberger intentionally or knowingly "exposed" her 
children to controlled substances or paraphernalia. In fact, the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing demonstrated the opposite -- that although there was marijuana and 
items the officers considered paraphernalia in the house, such items were kept in places 
that are generally out of reach to two and three year olds. Because the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing showed that the contraband was found in places where young 
children would not be exposed to it and there was no evidence that the Nieberger children 
were exposed to the marijuana or paraphernalia, the trial court erred in refusing to quash 
the bindover on these counts. 
"'[T]o bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show "probable cause" at a 
preliminary hearing by producing' evidence sufficient 'to support a reasonable belief that 
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an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.5" State v. Bradshaw, 
2004 UT App 298, f23, 99 P.3d 359 (cert granted) (quoting Clark. 2001 UT 9 at fflflO, 16 
(citations omitted)). "This means that the State must produce 'believable evidence of all 
the elements of the crime charged."' Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298 at |^23 (quoting Clark, 
2001 UT 9 at f 15). The probable cause standard at preliminary hearings is the same as 
the probable cause standard for arrest warrants. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at f 16. Moreover, the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution for purposes of bindover. State v. Virgin, 2004 UT App 251, f 11, 96 
P.3d 379 (further citations omitted). 
The marshaled evidence is as follows5: 
1. Ms. Nieberger lived with her husband and two children in Salt Lake County. 
R. 53-56, 66. The children were two years old and three years old. R. 55-6, 66. 
2. When officers arrived at the Nieberger home, both children were in the house. 
R. 55-6, 66. The three year old was in the bedroom with her parents. R. 55-6. The officer 
was not sure where the two year old was, and could not "say for sure if it was the living 
room or the children's bedroom." R. 70. 
5
 Although marshaling is not required since the magistrate did not make any 
findings as to demeanor or credibility of the witnesses and this Court "review[s] the 
magistrate's decision to bind over a defendant without deference," Ms. Nieberger 
nevertheless marshals the evidence for the convenience of the Court. See Virgin, 2004 
UTApp251,f9,n.2. 
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3. Officers found a small baggie of marijuana and a pipe on an entertainment 
center in the living room. R. 58, 60. There were also some rolling papers, a plastic bowl 
with a lid on it that may have had marijuana residue but was not tested, another pipe and a 
tool that might be used to scrape marijuana on the stand. R. 61, 72. Ms. Nieberger 
acknowledged that the items on the entertainment stand belonged to her and that she used 
marijuana on occasion. R. 57A, 58, 59. She told officers that the only drugs or 
paraphernalia that belonged to her were on the entertainment center. R. 58. 
4. The items on the entertainment center in the living room were on the top shelf, 
five to six feet off the ground. R. 60-1. The three year old was 2 XA to 3 feet tall and the 
two year old was "small" and "obviously shorter." R. 66-67. The officer thought the 
items were accessible to the children "if they had anything to stand on" because "if they 
get a chair out there they can enhance how tall they are" and "could have reached the 
items that are just right there in plain view on the entertainment center." R. 68. 
5. The entertainment center did not have doors. R. 60. There were no doors to the 
living room and there were no child gates; it appeared to the officer that the living room 
was accessible to the children. R. 67. The state did not present any evidence that either 
child was alone in the living room, that a chair was nearby or that either of the children 
had any contact or connection with the items on the entertainment center. 
6. Officers located other contraband in the house. Ms. Nieberger did not take 
responsibility for the other contraband. R. 58. 
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7. The other contraband included a bag with 171 grams of marijuana and a scale 
found in a high kitchen cupboard, probably 7 feet above the floor. R. 73. These items 
were high enough that the officer was not sure that the 4 foot 9 inch tall Appellant could 
have seen them from the floor; she would have had to stand on something in order to 
reach these items. R. 76-7. Officers also found a small container with plastic baggies and 
a pipe in the kitchen, but were not sure whether they were located in the 7 foot high 
cabinet with the marijuana or some other cabinet. R. 63. 
8. In addition, officers found a pill Ms. Nieberger identified as Valium in a plastic 
bag on the kitchen counter and a metal object with burn marks that the officer thought 
could be used to inhale marijuana in a kitchen drawer. R. 63. The metal object 
was not tested for marijuana. R. 65, 76. The officer believed that the older child might 
have been able to reach these items, "possibly without assistance but for sure if they were 
standing on something." R. 78. 
9. The officers also found a bong or smoking device on top of an entertainment 
center in the basement. R. 65. Another bong was found on the floor of the master 
bedroom closet, but that bong was broken and the officer could not remember whether the 
door to the closet was open or closed. R. 65, 75. The officer did not remember seeing 
water, residue or anything inside the bong in the closet and agreed that there was no 
indication that it was being used for any purpose. R. 75. 
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10. None of the items officers thought might have been used to inhale marijuana 
were tested for marijuana. R. 65, 75-76. 
11. The officer testified that there was no evidence that the children "had been 
exposed to, ingested, inhaled or had contact with controlled substance" other than, 
according to the officer, "the fact the items were just laying around the house." R. 78. 
In order to bind a defendant over for trial on the charge of child endangerment, the 
state must present evidence establishing probable cause as to all elements of the crime. In 
other words, the state must establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Nieberger 
"knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or permitted] a child . . . to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug 
paraphernalia . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
This marshaled evidence shows that there is no evidence that the children ingested 
or inhaled a controlled substance or paraphernalia and there is also no evidence that the 
children had contact with a controlled substance or paraphernalia. In this case, then, the 
only way for the state to establish probable cause that Ms. Nieberger committed the crime 
of child endangerment is to demonstrate probable cause to believe Ms. Nieberger 
knowingly or intentionally permitted the children "to be exposed to" a controlled 
substance or paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
The officer conceded that there was no evidence that the children had been 
"exposed to, ingested, inhaled or had contact with controlled substance" "other than the 
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fact that the items were just laying around the house." R. 78. The evidence shows, 
however, that the items were not "laying around the house" and instead were secreted in 
places where children could not see or access them. 
The items Ms. Nieberger acknowledged as hers were found on the top shelf of an 
entertainment center which was not readily accessible to the children. The shelf was five 
to six feet high whereas the older child was 2 XA to 3 feet tall and the other child smaller. 
The officer acknowledged that the children could not reach the items without the aid of a 
chair or something to stand on, and the state presented no evidence that a chair or stool 
was readily available to the children. Moreover, the children were only two and three 
years old and not very big, making it unlikely that they had the ability to drag a chair over 
to the entertainment center or would be left alone long enough to accomplish that task. 
The state also presented no evidence that the children had ever been alone in the living 
room. Most importantly, however, the state presented no evidence that the children had 
ever dragged a chair or stool over to the entertainment center, climbed up, and been 
"exposed" to the contraband on the entertainment center. Instead, the state's witness 
merely speculated that maybe the children could climb on something and thereby be 
exposed to the items on the entertainment center. This speculation was not sufficient to 
establish probable cause to believe the children had been exposed to the contraband on 
the entertainment center. 
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The state also failed to establish probable cause to establish that the children were 
exposed to the items in the kitchen. Marijuana6 was found in a cupboard seven feet high 
that Ms. Nieberger could not reach or see without enhancing her height. The state failed 
to demonstrate probable cause to believe Ms. Nieberger could see these items let alone 
that the children were exposed to them. The location of the items inside a cupboard well 
above the height of the children coupled with no evidence the children had any contact, 
connection or awareness of these items demonstrates that the state failed to establish 
probable cause to believe that the children had seen the items in the cupboard or were 
otherwise exposed to them. In fact, the location of these items demonstrates that the 
children did not have contact with or exposure to the bag of marijuana and any other 
items that might have been found in the seven-foot-high kitchen cupboard. 
The state likewise failed to establish probable cause to believe the children were 
exposed to, in violation of the statute, the pill found on the sink or the metal tube with 
burn marks found in a drawer. There is no evidence that the children had any access to 
these items, that the items qualified as contraband under the child endangerment statute or 
6
 The officer also found a container with plastic baggies and a pipe in a cabinet, 
but the officer was not sure whether the purported paraphernalia was in the same cabinet 
as the bag of marijuana or a different cabinet. R. 63. The officer's uncertainty of the 
location further demonstrates the lack of probable cause to believe the children were 
exposed to these items. According to the officer's testimony, these items may have been 
in the seven-foot-high cabinet with the bag of marijuana or some place equally 
inaccessible. By failing to pinpoint the location of these items, the state failed to 
establish that the children were exposed to them. 
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that the children were "exposed" to them. Additionally, there was no evidence that a chair 
or stool was nearby and available to aid the children in accessing these items. Instead, 
the state simply presented evidence that a prescription pill in a plastic bag was on the 
counter and a metal tube with burn marks7 that the officer thought could have been used 
as a pipe was in a drawer, and that the drawer and counter would have been accessible to 
the older child, especially if she used a chair. 
The state similarly did not establish probable cause to believe the children were 
exposed to the "bong" in the basement or the "bong" in the closet, in violation of the 
statute. The "bong" in the basement was on top of an entertainment center and the state 
presented no evidence regarding the children's access to that room, access to the top of 
the entertainment center, or actual "exposure" to the item. Additionally, the state did not 
establish that the children had access to the item in the master bedroom closet and could 
not establish whether the door to that closet was open or close. 
7
 Objects used to inhale or ingest marijuana qualify as paraphernalia pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (2002), but because many of these items are also in every 
day use, the considerations listed in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, along with all logically 
relevant factors, are considered in establishing whether an item is paraphernalia. The 
state failed to establish probable cause to believe the tube found in a kitchen drawer was 
paraphernalia since it did not test for residue, the tube was in a drawer rather than in 
close proximity to the marijuana in the cupboard, and the state did not present evidence 
other than the burn mark and the officer's speculation that the tube could be used to 
ingest marijuana. More importantly, however, the state failed to establish probable cause 
to believe that the children were exposed to this item. 
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Even under the trial court's incorrect conclusion that being "exposed to" 
contraband includes being able to see it, there was insufficient evidence to establish 
probable cause. As previously outlined, this application is incorrect since the statute 
requires that the children be exposed to the contraband and not that the contraband be 
exposed to the children. Even if the broad definition of "to make visible" were applied to 
the word "exposed" in the child endangerment statute, the statute would then require that 
the child be exposed to, or made visible to, the contraband. Nevertheless, for the purpose 
of argument, if the trial court were correct that allowing a child to be able to see 
contraband constitutes a violation of the statute, the evidence in this case did not establish 
probable cause to support such a violation. 
There is no evidence in this case that the children gained access to the items or saw 
the items. The contraband on the entertainment center in the living room and downstairs 
was high enough that a child could not see or otherwise be aware of it. The items in the 
seven-foot-high kitchen cupboard were behind a closed cupboard door and high enough 
that even Ms. Nieberger may not have been able to see them from the floor; the children 
therefore could not see them. There likewise was no evidence that the children had seen 
the item on the counter or in the drawer; in fact, the testimony suggested that the children 
could not see those items without standing on something so as to open the drawer or see 
the top of the counter. Finally, there was no evidence the children had seen the broken 
bong in the closet. The state did not establish probable cause to believe the door to the 
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closet was open since the officer could not remember whether it was open or closed, and 
there was no other evidence suggesting the children had seen the item in the closet. 
In all, the state's evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe that the 
children had been exposed to any of the items of contraband found in the Nieberger home 
even when the statute is given its broadest application. The bindover on two counts of 
child endangerment should therefore have been quashed. 
B. IF THIS COURT ATTEMPTS TO SAVE THE STATUTE FROM ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES BY NARROWLY APPLYING THE 
TERM "EXPOSED TO" TO INCLUDE CONTACT OR A DIRECT 
CONNECTION THAT GIVES RISE TO ACTUAL DANGER OR A 
SIGNIFICANT RISK OF HARM, THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUSTAIN 
A BINDOVER ON THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT COUNTS. 
As previously outlined supra at 15-32, the child endangerment statute violates both 
prongs of the void for vagueness test and therefore violates due process since (1) it fails to 
give notice as to what conduct is prohibited and (2) fails to establish minimal guidelines 
for enforcement and is therefore subject to arbitrary and discriminatory application. The 
use of the broad term "exposure" without defining that term and the failure of the statute 
to require a significant risk of harm give rise to these constitutional infirmities. While 
Ms. Nieberger believes that statute is unconstitutional and cannot be construed so as to 
avoid the constitutional infirmities, should this Court determine that the statute can be 
construed so as to save it from its constitutional infirmities, the state also failed to 
establish probable cause to support the charges under such an approach. Should this 
Court choose to construe the statute to limit the term "exposed to" to those activities that 
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rise to the same level as ingestion, inhalation and contact and require that the exposure 
create a significant risk of harm, i.e. create danger, to the child that is actual and 
appreciable, the evidence in this case cannot sustain a bindover for child endangerment. 
As previously outlined, even under a broad definition of the term "exposed to," the 
evidence did not support a bindover. Additionally, there is no evidence that any arguable 
"exposure" of the children rose to the level of ingestion, inhalation or contact. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that the children faced danger or a significant risk of appreciable 
harm from contraband items that were out of reach in their house. The marijuana was in 
bags in high, out of reach locations. There was no evidence that the items the police 
thought were paraphernalia would harm the children through contact, let alone 
"exposure," and the items were not tested to even establish that they had residue on them. 
Unlike methamphetamine production which causes a significant risk of danger to others 
in the household due to the chemicals involved and the noxious contamination of air and 
items, the existence of marijuana in the home may not create any cognizable risk for a 
child living in the home. In this case where the items were out of reach and there was no 
showing that the children had contact with, were aware of, or were impacted in any way 
by the marijuana or paraphernalia, the state failed to establish probable cause that 
Ms. Nieberger committed two counts of child endangerment. Accordingly, the bindover 
on two counts of child endangerment should be quashed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Kathleen Nieberger, by and through counsel Joan C. Watt 
and Shannon N. Romero, respectfully requests that this Court hold that the child 
endangerment statute violates due process or, in the alternative, reverse the denial of the 
motion to quash the two child endangerment counts, and remand the case to the trial court 
for trial without the two child endangerment counts. 
SUBMITTED this fgg day of March, 2005. 
v / W - .^*>J£V 
JOAN C. WATT 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QU OCT 13 PH 3 : 56 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OFUTAH v I MrTC0URl 
West Valley Department ; $ E $ m U E Y DEPT. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHLEEN MARIA NIEBERGER, Case No. 041100233 
Defendant. Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
The above matter came before the Court for oral argument on Kathleen Maria 
Nieberger's (Defendant) motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 
unconstitutional on September 13, 2004. Lana Taylor appeared on behalf of the State of Utah 
and Shannon Romero appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the matter under 
advisement. Having reviewed the file and having researched the law pertaining to the issue, the 
Court DENIES the Defendant's motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 
unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND 
1 On December 22, 2003, Salt Lake County Detective Jason Watkins (Watkins) executed a 
search warrant at Defendant's residence, located at 5944 West Honesilver Circle, Salt 
Lake County. 
2 Watkins found Defendant and her husband and their three year old child in the master 
bedroom. 
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3 While the residence was searched, Watkins interviewed the Defendant. During the 
interview, the Defendant admitted that she used marijuana "when having a bad week." 
4 The Defendant also admitted that several items in the residence were hers, e.g., items in 
the entertainment center, which included a marijuana pipe, a small plastic baggie of 
marijuana, a container of marijuana and another marijuana pipe in with it, and a tool 
suspected of being used for scraping resin from marijuana pipes. 
5 Additional items were found in the kitchen, e.g., a large bag of marijuana, a bag 
containing a marijuana pipe, and a small metal item in a kitchen drawer that may have 
been used for smoking or burning marijuana, also a bong was found in the basement 
entertainment center and another bong was found in the master bedroom closet. 
6 The drugs and paraphernalia were in plain view and a child had free access to all of the 
areas in which paraphernalia and marijuana were found. 
7 Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 
Utah Code § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), a third degree felony; two counts of endangerment of a 
child or elder adult in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-112.5, a third degree felony; and 
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code § 58-37A-5. 
8 At the preliminary hearing, on June 10, 2004, the State amended the first count to be 
possession of marijuana, in violation of § 58-37-8, a class B misdemeanor. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court bound over for trial concluding that there was 
sufficient evidence to find probable cause on count 1 as amended, and counts II, III and 
IV as charged. 
9 Thereafter, the Defendant filed the present motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
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112.5 unconstitutional challenging both (1) the constitutionality of the endangerment of 
child or elder adult statute, § 76-5-112.5 and (2) the quantum of proof produced by the 
State at the preliminary hearing that the Defendant committed the crime of endangerment 
of a child. 
I 
VAGUENESS 
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, the court must first analyze the plain 
language of the statute. State v. Macguire, 2004 UT 4, fll5, 84 P.3d 1171, 1175. "We need not 
look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in it." Id. at 1J15 {citing Utah Sck 
Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd OfEduc, 2001 UT 2,1fl3, 17 P.3d 1125). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
"A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law. . . . When addressing 
such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, [^5, 31 P.3d 547. 
"Additionally, legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and those who challenge 
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, [^42 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[Vjagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the 
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." Id. at [^43. Where a statute "implicates no 
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constitutionally protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge only if the 
[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at 
1J12 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estate v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-95 (1982). 
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a 
facial vagueness challenge. . . . In order to establish that the complained of 
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that 
the statutes do not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to 
understand what conduct [is prohibited], or (2) that the statutes encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Id. at 1J13 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Green, supra, 
2004 UT at |43 . 
"If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited, it is not unconstitutionally vague." Id. at ^14. "[A] defendant who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, [^44 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms 
must be examined in light of the facts at hand. . . . Additionally, a court should examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law when a 
challenged statute implicates no constitutionally protected conduct." State v. Green, supra, 2004 
UT at 1(44 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 
Utah courts have upheld statutes with undefined terms that were challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah \9S\)(upheld 
statute where "gross deviation" was undefined); State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App. 54, ^14, 975 
P.2d 489, 496 (Utah App. \999)(upheld statute where "delinquent" was undefined); Salt Lake 
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City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App. I997)(upheldstatute where "emotional distress" 
was undefined). 
In State v. Owens, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute legitimately 
proscribed a broad spectrum of conduct and the undefined term had a common sense meaning. 
638P.2dat 1184. 
In State v. Krueger, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the widespread 
usage of the terms "delinquency" and "contributing to the delinquency" of a minor to give clear 
and understandable meaning to those terms of the statute. State v. Krueger, supra, 1999 UT 
App. at 1J14. The Court of Appeals evaluated the connotation of those terms and whether such 
connotations were "sufficiently well known that persons of ordinary intelligence and judgment 
who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their conduct by the statute." Id at 
H15. 
In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the statute's 
specific intent requirement and stated that "a specific intent requirement significantly vitiates any 
claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a person of common intelligence into 
misunderstanding what is prohibited." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1265. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals examined the complainant's conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally 
applied to the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that given the defendant's 
knowledge and conduct, he could not claim that the statute was vague as applied to him, "let 
alone that the statute is totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id 
When a term is undefined, the term's ordinary and accepted meaning is often taken from 
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the dictionary. See, e.g., Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App. 344, f 13, 994 P.2d 206 {defining 
"peril" with Webster's Dictionary). 
A 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) is presumed to be constitutional, therefore, Defendant bears a 
heavy burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. The Court concludes that Defendant fails 
to carry her heavy burden. Section 76-5-112.5(2) clearly gives notice that ordinary people of 
intelligence and judgment who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their 
conduct by the statute. Ordinary people of intelligence and judgment reading § 76-5-112.5(2) 
would understand that if a person knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder 
adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia they are guilty of a third degree felony. 
There is no constitutional right to causing or permitting a child to be exposed to or have 
contact with a controlled substance, a chemical substance or drug paraphernalia, therefore, 
Defendant's facial vagueness challenge will succeed only if the statute is "impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at ^ |12. 
The Defendant contends that the term "exposed" is undefined and therefore, does not 
provide a person of reasonable intelligence with enough detail to know what type of conduct is 
prohibited. The Defendant argues that there is no way of knowing what is meant by the term 
"exposed." The Court does not agree. 
The term "exposed" needs no definition to be constitutional. By not defining the term 
"exposed" the legislature did not "impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to judges and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis" as argued by the Defendant. Rather, the 
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legislature allows the fact finder to evaluate the facts of a case and apply the term "exposed" 
using the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term. "Expose" as defined by Webster's is: 
la. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2 To subject {e.g., a photographic film) to the action of 
light. 3. To make visible . . . : a To make known {e.g., a crime); b. To reveal the 
guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without shelter or food. 
Random House Webster's dictionary at 250 (4th Ed. 2001); see also Webster's II: New Riverside 
University Dictionary at 452 (1988). 
The statute legitimately reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow the fact finder to 
determine under the specific facts of the case whether the child or elder were "exposed" to "a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia." There is no ambiguity in the 
statute and since the plain meaning of the statute is clear using the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the term "exposed," the Court need not look to the legislative intent. 
Under the facts of this case, the Defendant admitted that she owned a marijuana pipe, a 
small plastic baggie of marijuana, a container of marijuana and another marijuana pipe in with it, 
and a tool suspected of being used for scraping resin from marijuana pipes. Furthermore, 
additional items were found in the kitchen, e.g., a large bag of marijuana, a bag containing a 
marijuana pipe, and a small metal item in a kitchen drawer that may have been used for smoking 
or burning marijuana, also a bong was found in the basement entertainment center and another 
bong was found in the master bedroom closet. These items were in plain view and Defendant's 
child had free access to all of the areas in which paraphernalia and marijuana were found 
Applying the common sense, ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed," the 
marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were visible and the child was not protected from them, 
therefore, the child was "exposed" to the items. Moreover, the intent requirement that the 
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Defendant "knowingly or intentionally" exposed the child significantly vitiates the impact of not 
defining the term "exposed" because a person of common intelligence would understand what is 
prohibited. 
As applied in this case, Section 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, therefore, the statute 
cannot be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications" as required to succeed on a vagueness 
challenge. 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement because there are not minimal guidelines or circumstances where "exposure" occurs 
to guide law enforcement and judges, therefore, they consciously or subconsciously discriminate 
against certain classes of individuals. 
Although the Court need not address this challenge, because the Court previously decided 
that as applied in this case § 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, the Court clarifies that § 76-5-
112.5(2) legitimately proscribes a broad spectrum of conduct. To attempt to define guidelines or 
circumstances would be arbitrary. See, e.g., State v. Owens, supra, 638 P.2d at 1184-85. As 
written, § 76-5-112.5(2) avoids arbitrarily narrowing the proscribed conduct and allows the fact 
finder to determine whether under the circumstances the child or elder person was "exposed" to 
"a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia" applying the common sense, 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed." 
B 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) is unconstitutionally vague because the statute 
appears to criminalize potential harm rather than actual harm. Specifically, Defendant argues 
that the mere possibility or risk of "exposure" is sufficient to support the charge, which is 
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unconstitutional and cites several non-binding cases. The Court is not persuaded. 
Based upon the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term "exposed" as stated 
above, a person may decide under the circumstances whether the child or elder adult was 
"exposed" to the prohibited items. The Court is not inclined to believe that the only harm is 
actual inhalation, ingesting or contact with because the Legislature did include the term 
"exposed," which under the general ordinary meaning of the word includes "to lay open," or 
"make visible," oi to remove shelter or protection from." These definitions are less than actual 
inhalation, ingestion or contact with, but are within the ordinary meaning of "exposed." 
Furthermore, just because a child or elder adult does not inhale, ingest or have contact with the 
prohibited items does not mean that they are not harmed 
II 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the State failed to demonstrate probable cause to 
believe the Defendant committed the offense of child endangerment. The Court does not agree. 
The "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover" is the same as that required 
for issuance of an arrest warrant: "[T]he prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, fl 16. The Court outlined the magistrate's role, summarizing the 
conclusions of a number of prior cases: 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. At this 
stage of the proceeding, the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is 
relatively low because the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues. Accordingly, when faced with conflicting evidence, the 
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magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the 
fact finder at trial. Instead, the magistrate must view all evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution. Yet, the magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not 
that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . . Even with this limited role, the 
magistrate must attempt to ensure that all groundless and improvident 
prosecutions are ferreted out no later than the preliminary. 
Id. at f 10 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; interpolation by the Court; 
emphasis added). The Clark court held "that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must still produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id. (Internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schroyer, 44 P.3d 730, 732 (Utah 2002); State v. 
Robinson, 63 P.3d 105, 106 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the State's favor, the Court concludes that the State met its burden to bind over to 
show a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. 
As stated above, supra I.A., the Defendant admitted that she owned a marijuana pipe, a small 
plastic baggie of marijuana, a container of marijuana and another marijuana pipe in with it, and a 
tool suspected of being used for scraping resin from marijuana pipes. Furthermore, additional 
items were found in the kitchen, e.g., a large bag of marijuana, a bag containing a marijuana pipe, 
and a small metal item in a kitchen drawer that may have been used for smoking or burning 
marijuana, also a bong was found in the basement entertainment center and another bong was 
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found in the master bedroom closet. The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence at 
the preliminary hearing to show probable cause that Defendant kno * inglj oi intentionally caused 
her child to be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical substance or drug paraphernalia. 
I he Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
I " 7. ••••• institutional. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
•PW !v- to 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV / 9 200% 
ooOoo-
Kathleen Nieberger, 
Petitioner 
v, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20040907-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. 
DATED this 1 day of November, 2004. 
FOR THE COURT: 
(Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other 
chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. 
Intent under this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, 
quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to 
manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 
76-5-109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37a-3. 
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or 
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the 
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or 
elder adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in 
accordance with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled 
substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition 
as in Section 58-37-2. 
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MALE: Number 159 the 28 (inaudible) donated one day absence you'll 
(inaudible) dangerous. 
FEMALE: Senate bill 188 potential for children and elderly Pete Swazzle (?) 
this was hurting law enforcement of criminal justice with a vote of eight yes, zero no, 
three absent. 
MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) you are again. 
MALE3: I would move to circle that place. 
MR. SPEAKER: Motion to circle Senate Bill one, excuse me, (inaudible) Cox 
are you prepared to address this bill? 
COX: I would withdraw my motion. 
MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) to withdraw the motion representative. Okay the 
bill has been read in and we'll go to representative Cox for presentation of Senate Bill 
188. 
COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. I appreciate the opportunity to present this 
bill to you. What this basically does is changes the penalties re, related to operating a 
Clandestine uh, drug lab that presents significant risks of injury or even potential death to 
children, or to the elderly who might uh, be forced actually to live in those conditions. 
Uh, if this bill is passed it would be a third degree felony to recklessly or knowingly or 
intentionally cause or permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from 
exposure to a controlled substance, a chemical substance or to drug paraphernalia. The 
1 
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1 second degree felony if there were actually harm caused by the exposure to the illegal 
2 substances. Excuse me. It would be a first degree felony if that child or elderly person 
3 died because of the exposure. It's fairly simple in nature. It's uh, supported by the, the 
4 prosecutor's association, attorney general's office and uh, youth and family specialists 
5 that uh, work in this arena. I'm open for questions. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Discussion to the bill, representative Bush. 
7 BUSH: May I question the sponsor? 
8 MR. SPEAKER: Sponsor yield? 
9 MALE: Yes. 
10 MR. SPEAKER: Yes you may proceed. 
11 BUSH: What's the, what's the definition of elderly? 
12 MALE: The same, the same definition that is already in statute 
13 representative. 
14 BUSH: What is it? 
15 MALE: I don't know. Nobody wants to say either. 
16 BUSH: Just don't, just don't do anything harmful to me. 
17 MALE: It's line, it's line 52 in the uh, in the bill. Elder adult means the same 
18 as that term defined in Section 76-5-111. I don't have that opened right now. 
19 MR. SPEAKER: To the bill, representative Dillary? 
20 DILLARY: Uh yes my question is there's no fiscal note on the bill and under 
2 
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1 normal circumstances when we increase uh, penalties or enhance uh, bring on a new 
2 felony or something this would involve incarceration and there would be a, a financial 
3 impact. 
• MALE: We (inaudible) 
5 MR. SPEAKER: Did you want him to yield the question? 
5 DILLARY: Yes, 
1 MR. SPEAKER: Okay. 
I DILLARY: I want him to address why there isn't one. 
) MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) Cox will you yield? 
) COX: Yes. 
I MR. SPEAKER: Yes, go ahead. 
I COX: Thank you. Fiscal analysts indicated this could be done with in current 
5 budgets. 
I DILLARY: That's a first. 
5 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you representative Wright to the bill. 
5 WRIGHT: Thank you would sponsor yield? 
J MALE: I'll try. 
I WRIGHT: Representative Cox 
) MR. SPEAKER: (inaudible) you may proceed. 
) WRIGHT: You say we enhance the penalties, what, what were they previously 
3 
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1 and what are the enhancing to? 
2 COX: ...Anywhere from uh, misdemeanors to third degree felonies. 
3 WRIGHT: Previously to now so this, this makes all these third degree felonies 
4 and what, what's the difference I guess. 
5 COX: No. The difference now is that if the bi, if the individual creates that um, 
6 that condition, that and they do that recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, uh cause or 
7 permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from exposure to those 
8 substances, be a second degree felony if there was actual harm caused. If death resulted 
9 as, as a result of that condition then it's a first degree felony. 
10 WRIGHT: So what would be the penalty for just having a drug lab now? 
11 COX: It's just a misdemeanor for just having a uh, lab. 
12 WRIGHT: So it still would be a misdemeanor except we just, uh, and I su, I 
13 support you know what we're trying to do but I'm wondering why, why don't we just 
14 raise the penalties for having the drug lab in the first place. What, what you did was 
15 actually if you had bodily harm, so you have to prove some type of bodily harm and then 
16 it enhances the penalty rather then 
17 COX: If, if there's, if there's actual cause of injury or death it enhances the 
18 penalty, yes. 
19 WRIGHT: The question I would have is this a good way, why don't we just 
20 raise the penalty for a drug lab? You know maybe I'm a little naive for having it in the 
4 
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[ first place, whether we 
I MALE: I, I think that's another bill that uh, representative uh, Tyler has 
! worked on quite a bit. 
I WRIGHT: Okay. Thank you. 
) MR. SPEAKER: Thank you for the discussions representative Dayton. 
> DAYTON: Thank you Mr. Speaker, will sponsor yield? 
1 MR. SPEAKER: Will the sponsor yield? 
I MALE: Absolutely. 
) MR. SPEAKER Yes you may proceed. 
) DAYTON: I, I'd like to pursue the questions that representative Wright had only 
[ because um, somewhere between child and elderly, um there are a lot of people that don't 
! know about meth labs or even the danger that's involved in them and I'm uh, presuming 
! the way the bill is written is if a child or an elderly person wouldn't be able to remove 
I- themselves from a situation, but, but a lot of people wouldn't, wouldn't know to. Until it 
> was too late, um, I'm, I'm just confused about that, would you ad, address that concern? 
> MALE: These are, these are the people that are vulnerable that generally 
don't have the choice, they're, they either don't have a choice because they're too young 
I or they're frightened, not able to leave, uh, their own children will be ere, creating the 
) hazard in their home and they're concerned about being able to have anywhere else to go, 
) um, because they have nowhere else to go. 
5 
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1 DAYTON: Thank you. 
2 MR. SPEAKER: For the discussion of the bill representative CURTIS. 
3 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker, I would like to reserve the right to make a 
4 motion. 
5 MR. SPEAKER: You made (inaudible) and reserve that right. 
6 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker and will the sponsor yield to a question? 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Do you yield representative Cox? 
8 COX: Reluctantly. 
9 MR. SPEAKER: You may proceed. 
10 CURTIS: Um, it appears that in the a committee that, well it appears that the 
11 original intent of the bill was to go after intentional cont, con, conduct, um and the 
12 committee knowing or intentional conduct, the committee edited the criminal copeability 
13 standard of reckless, recklessly exposing somebody. Could you help me understand, 
14 what, why uh, they were going in that direction? 
15 MALE: I think that's consistent with other, with language in other crimes. 
16 That they recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, that, that's consistent with the criminal 
17 code you're quite aware of that. 
18 CURTIS: Well it's not consistent, representatives, if Mr. Speaker if I could 
19 place my motion to amend. 
20 MR. SPEAKER: You may proceed. 
6 
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CURTIS: On the golden rod copy line 53,1 would simply move to delete 
recklessly, and if I may speak to that. 
MR. SPEAKER: You may, uh, let me repeat that, on, on the golden rod copy 
line 53 we delete the word recklessly. 
CURTIS: Yes. 
MR. SPEAKER: Okay you may proceed with explanation. 
CURTIS: Thank you uh, Mr. Speaker. Representatives in the criminal code 
there's a, there's a chapter entitled Chapter 2 which is principles of criminal 
responsibility and then copeability is defined and you have a generally four standards of 
criminal copeability. You have an intentional, a knowingly, a reckless or with criminal 
negligence. And what we've done here in this bill is we've elevated the penalties, and 
we've taken three of the four criminal standards of copeability. I think if somebody 
intentionally or knowingly exposes somebody to these chemicals that they should have 
some elevated principles, elevated copeability, but a reckless exposure to then say we're 
going to elevate it, not every crime is as a reckless crime. When representative Cox says 
well, I, I am familiar with the criminal code and that's why you have different levels of, 
you have homicide, and you have manslaughter, and you have negligent homicide and 
you have different levels based upon the copeability, but we've lumped all the 
copeability together and elevated the penalties. I'm asking to take that one level of 
copeability off and a reckless standard saying we did an intentional and knowingly and 
7 
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1 uncomfortable with elevating the standard. But I'm not comfortable in elevating the 
2 penalty if we're going to lower the standards to. 
3 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Cox response to motion to amend? 
4 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Protam. I'd resist the motion, uh, this was 
5 recommended by the prosecutors. You got to recognize that when these individuals that 
6 have created this situation, this dangerous, dangerous situation, oft times they are under 
7 the influence of the drug themselves and what they do they do recklessly. We need to 
8 hold them copeable. We need to hold them accountable for that. And it should be at a 
9 higher level because of the danger that they're placing these small children and these 
10 elderly adults in. It's worthy of an elevated penalty. And I'd resist the motion on that. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to the motion to amend. Seeing none, 
12 representative Curtis for summation on your motion. 
13 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I agree with representative Cox, it's worthy 
14 of an elevated penalty. It's not worthy of a lower standard of copeability. There's a 
15 distinction and there's a difference and when you as, and when you go in to do establish 
16 how somebody did something if you're driving negligently and you kill somebody that's 
17 different then if you intentionally kill somebody. What we're doing is we're lumping all 
18 the standards of copeability together to get an elevated penalty. And I (tape went out). 
19 Thank you. 
20 MR. SPEAKER: We'll place the motion to amend. The amendment is on the 
8 
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golden rod copy line 53 we delete the word recklessly. All in favor of the motion to 
amend say I. 
GROUP: I 
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed no. 
GROUP: No. 
MR. SPEAKER: Sheriff rules, the motion carries. Five or more standing? 
Five or more standing be in division. Voting is open.... Having voted we'll close the 
vote. Voting will be closed. Motion to Amend having received 39 yes notes and 24 no 
votes passes. Good ears as usual. Further discussion to the bill. Seeing none, 
representative Cox for summation on the bill. 
COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. Law enforcement has been working very 
hard to clean up the meth labs in our communities. This provides them with the 
opportunity, a better tool to do that, to be better enforcers of the laws that we as a body 
have enacted. Uh, I'd appreciate your positive vote on this bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: Thank you, voting is open on Senate Bill 188.... Seeing all 
present having voted we'll close the vote. Senate Bill 188 having received 67 yes votes 
and 0 no votes will be returned to the senate for further action. Representative Norris 
Stevens. , , _ ^ ^ / 
FEMALE: House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with 
controlled substance or precursor Trisha Beck. This was heard in judiciary with a vote of 
9 
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1 9 yes and 0 no 4 absent. 
2 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Beck. 
3 BECK: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Urn, actually there were two oversights 
4 either section dealing with endangerment of a child or an elder adult and this bill merely 
5 corrects those oversights from the problems. The first problem is that the section 
6 contains an all court proof requirement. It's obviously intended to cover the situation 
7 where a person knowingly and intentionally gives a child or elder adult a controlled 
8 substance and there by exposes him of or her to injury. This section should have simply 
9 made it illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled substance. Obviously they 
10 have already determined that the controlled substances are risky to an individual's health, 
11 otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is true with the drug 
12 paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs. The current language 
13 unintentionally requires the prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that the 
14 controlled substances are dangerous. That's not only expensive but it's also ridiculous to 
15 spend all their time trying to show that. The other oversight in this section is that it 
16 contains no exceptions for drugs which are administered in accordance with the 
17 prescription from a (inaudible) physician. This bill also fixes that problem as it says in 
18 the last two paragraphs. So this also urn, passed through the committee, um on it as a 
19 consensus bill, as on, it passed through the committee unanimously. So with that, that 
20 I'm open for any questions. 
10 
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MR. SPEAKER: Discussion to House Bill 125. See no lights. Uh, voting is 
open on House Bill 125.... Sorry about that. Representative Beck waives summation. 
It's obviously getting late.... Seeing all present, representative Murray, representative 
Addaire, Senurey, Senior, Senate Bowman, I think the time's getting near, representative 
Hanson, seeing all present and having voted Senate Bowman. Voting will be closed. 
House Bill 125 having received 71 yes votes 0 no votes passes this body and referred to 
the Senate for further consideration. Madam Reading Clerk. 
MALE: Senate Bill 188 7 
FEMALE: Senate Bill 188 protection for children and elderly, Senator Swazzle. 
MALE: Senator Swazzle. 
SWAZZLE: And thank you Ms. President, uh this bill uh, as we discussed 
yesterday addresses a very serious issue and that is the production of methamphetamines. 
This bill would uh, put in place a series of penalties for those clandestine drug operators 
as they manufacture these uh, illegal drugs and would put in place a penalty of a third 
degree if they knowingly or intentionally cause or permit a child or elder to suffer bodily 
injury. Second degree felony if they actually are harmed and a first degree felony if that 
child or elder actually dies as a result of those illegal substances. 
MALE: Questions for Senator Swazzle. (Inaudible) questions being called. 
Senate Bill 188 pass roll call. 
FEMALE: (inaudible) Ellett 
11 
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ELLETT: I 
FEMALE: Blackham, 
BLACKHAM I 
FEMALE: Davis... Demetris 
DEMETRIS: I 
FEMALE: Bev Evans ... Bart Evans 
BART EVANS: I 
FEMALE: Vel 
VEL: I 
FEMALE: Callowell 
CALLOWELL: I 
FEMALE: Villiard 
VILLIARD: I 
FEMALE: Al 
AL: I 
FEMALE: Holt 
HOLT: I 
FEMALE: Jones 
JONES: I 
FEMALE: Julander... Knutsen 
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KNUTSEN: I 
FEMALE: Densel... Maine 
MAINE: I 
FEMALE: Montgomery 
MONTGOMERY: I 
FEMALE: Nielstein 
NIELSTEIN: I 
FEMALE: Nielsen 
NIELSEN: I 
FEMALE: Peterson 
PETERSON: I 
FEMALE: Knowlton 
KNOWLTON: I 
FEMALE: Stanford... Steele 
STEELE: I 
FEMALE: Stevenson 
STEVENSON: I 
FEMALE: Swazzle 
SWAZZLE: I 
FEMALE: Valentine 
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1 VALENTINE: I 
2 FEMALE: Waddit 
3 WADDIT: I 
4 FEMALE: (inaudible) Bailey 
5 BAILEY: I 
6 MALE: Senate Bill 188 has 27 I votes, no nay votes two being absent. 
7 Passes to the third reading count. Excuse me, passes to the house for their consideration. 
8 Next bill sub 
+-^<^R>\L^ h-<T <;e^T^ D ^ ^ V F ? (M*W+ £~,2-<*>0 
9 MR. PRESIDENT: (inaudible) House Bill 125. y 
10 FEMALE: House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with 
11 controlled substance or precursor representative Beck, Senator Julander. 
12 MR PRESIDENT: Senator Julander. 
13 JULANDER: Thank you Mr. President, we've had uh, several discussions 
14 on this bill and we're trying to correct two oversights that had been in the uh, code um, to 
15 the present. The first problem was, was the awkward proof of requirement and we solved 
16 that yesterday with Senator uh, Valentines amendment, uh and um, the other was the um, 
17 the section that contains no exemption for drugs which are, are administered in 
18 accordance with the prescription from a physician. So unless there are any questions. 
19 MR. PRESIDENT: Any questions for Senator Julander on this bill? ... See non 
20 Senator. 
14 
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JULANDER: (inaudible) with the question that uh, 
MR PRESIDENT: Question is should House Bill 125 pass? Roll call vote. 
FEMALE: Senator Allen .. Ron Allen 
ALLEN: I 
FEMALE: Blaneum.. (inaudible) 
MALE: I 
FEMALE: Brothers 
BROTHERS: I 
FEMALE: Davis 
DAVIS: I 
FEMALE: Demitrige 
DEMITRIGE: I 
FEMALE: Eastman 
EASTMAN: I 
FEMALE: Ericks 
ERICKS: I 
FEMALE: Gregra 
GREGRA: I 
FEMALE: Hale... Halerow 
HALEROW: I 
15 
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1 FEMALE: Hickman ...HiUyard 
2 HILL-YARD: I 
3 FEMALE: Jokums 
4 JOKUMA: I 
5 FEMALE: Julander 
6 JULANDER: I 
7 FEMALE: Knudson 
8 KNUDSON: I 
9 FEMALE: Maine 
10 MAINE: I 
11 FEMALE: Peterson 
12 PETERSON: I 
13 FEMALE: Polton 
14 POLTON: I 
15 FEMALE: Spencer 
16 SPENCER: I 
17 FEMALE: Steele 
18 STEELE: I 
19 FEMALE: Stevenson 
20 STEVENSON: I 
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FEMALE: Swazzle 
SWAZZLE: I 
FEMALE: Valentine 
VALENTINE: I 
FEMALE: Claudertz 
CLAUDERTZ: I 
FEMALE: Walker 
WALKER: I 
FEMALE Wright 
WRIGHT: I 
FEMALE: (inaudible) 
MALE: I 
MR. PRESIDENT: House Bill 125 is received 26 I votes no nay votes three being 
absent, passes. Will be referred back to the House for further consideration as it was 
amended. We'll now go to 
17 
0001.02 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM E 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA*** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2000 GENERAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 86 AND 2000 UT APP 291 *** 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2000) 
§ 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "chemical substance" means a substance used as a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or 
any other chemical, as demonstrated by its use, quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to 
manufacturing equipment which was intended to be used in the manufacture of controlled substances; 
(b) "child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5-109(1 )(a); 
(c) "controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(d) "drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in Section 58-37a-3; and 
(e) "elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly or intentionally causes or 
permits a child or elder adult to be at risk of suffering bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury 
from exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug 
paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who violates Subsection (2), and a child or 
elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of 
the second degree unless the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or elder adult, in 
which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-5-112.5, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 187, § 2. 
NOTES: 
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 2000, ch. 187 became effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. —Prosecution of mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled 
substance to child, 70 A.L.R.5th 461. 
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